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THE REVENUE RULE: A COMMON LAW
DOCTRINE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY
BRENDA MALLINAK*
The revenue rule, a common law doctrine with origins in the
eighteenth century, is a battleground in the twenty-first century as
criminal and civil courts address liability for acts of smuggling that
contravene revenue laws of foreign governments. In its modern form
the revenue rule generally allows courts to decline entertaining suits
or enforcing foreign tax judgments or foreign revenue laws; but in the
context of the present litigation, the scope of the rule is far from certain. This Article presents the evolution of the common law rule in
English courts and its adaptation by American courts and examines
the application of the revenue rule in the twentieth century by common law jurisdictions. The Article traces the revenue rule from its
beginnings as a judicial refusal to allow private parties to negate their
contracts on the basis of a violation of foreign laws through its evolution into a judicial refusal to allow a foreign government to enforce its
tax laws and raise revenues through the domestic judiciary. Additionally, the Article detours shortly into the revenue rule’s place in
the relationships between sister states in the United States. Finally,
the Article analyzes a criminal case in which the United States Supreme Court recently considered the scope of the revenue rule and a
civil case remanded to the Second Circuit by the Supreme Court in
light of the ruling in the criminal case.
Having established the viability of the doctrine, the Article addresses the use of treaties to circumvent the rule. The Article concludes that treaties are underutilized as a mechanism to allow collection of tax judgments originating in one jurisdiction when
enforcement is sought in a second jurisdiction, and that the reluctance
demonstrated by the U.S. Senate and the Executive Branch to enter
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treaty agreements to facilitate cross-border tax collection precludes
judicial interference.
The revenue rule is one basis of defense in criminal wire fraud
prosecutions and civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz ations (RICO) actions. These actions and the lack of treaty collection
procedures have resulted in a debate within the legal community regarding the foundation of the doctrine and its continued viability.
This Article presents the main arguments on both sides of the debate.
Finally, the Article concludes that the revenue rule has an important
role in the realm of international relations and should not be discarded merely because it causes some untoward results in the smuggling cases. The Article discusses other methods of tax collection and
why their use relieves courts of the necessity for examining the revenue laws of foreign nations to enforce foreign tax judgments or to assist in the collection of taxes.
I. FROM WHENCE THE DOCTRINE COMES
The earliest reported case referencing the revenue rule was decided in 1729.1 In Attorney General v. Lutwydge, import duties were
sought on tobacco sold at Dumfries, Scotland in an English court.2
The Attorney General argued that “the question now did not depend
upon the residence of the parties, but upon the nature of the matter
for which the bond was given.”3 Lord Chief Baron Pengelly, in
agreement with the Attorney General’s description of the action, held
that “[b]efore the union this court had no jurisdiction of the revenues
in Scotland, and therefore the question is, whether the statute is not
exclusive of us, since it is giving a farther jurisdiction to them who had
it exclusive of us before.”4 The English court was unwilling to enforce
a bond executed in Scotland for Scottish duties on tobacco, because
the obligation was a foreign tax obligation.5
During the remainder of the eighteenth century, English courts
addressed the applicability of the laws of foreign nations with respect
to the enforcement of commercial transactions. In Boucher v. Law-

1. Att’y Gen. v. Lutwydge, (1729) 145 Eng. Rep. 674 (Ex. Div.).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. Scotland and England were separate countries until the Act of Union constitutionally united Scotland and England into the Kingdom of Great Britain in 1707. N ORMAN
DAVIES, THE ISLES, A HISTORY 624-27 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
5. Id.
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son6 , Justice Lee, in his concurring opinion, stated: “[T]he right of an
English subject cannot be altered by the general law of any other
country.”7 Lawson, the ship owner, hired Fletcher, to serve as master
of his ship. Fletcher accepted a parcel of Portuguese gold from
Boucher for delivery in London. 8 Portugal’s law proscribed the export of gold. 9 Boucher, who was ready to pay the freight charges,
sought delivery from Lawson, who failed to deliver.10 Lawson pled he
did not possess the gold, and that it was “usual when any gold is exported from Portugal to this kingdom, for the master of the vessel to
take the whole freight to his own use, without accounting for any part
of it to his owners.”11 In other words, Lawson claimed that Fletcher
had made off with the gold.
As a defense against the claim of master/servant liability, Lawson
offered the illegality of the export of gold under Portuguese law.12
Lord Chief Justice Hardwicke explained that “trade prohibited by the
laws of England is of material consequence, and it is said that the parties in that case shall receive no relief, as they are both participes
criminis.”13 But upon consideration of a foreign law, Lord Hardwicke
posited that “goods are prohibited to be exported by the laws of any
foreign country from whence they are brought, therefore the parties
should have no remedy or action here, it would cut off all benefit of
such trade from this kingdom which would be of very bad consequence.”14 Because the law was Portuguese, Lawson could not raise it
in his defense before an English court. Lord Hardwicke concluded:
“[I]t does not seem that the unlawfulness of this trade in Portugal,
since it is lawful in England, will have any effect on the determination
of this case.”15 Thus, the enforcement of a commercial contract was
separated from consideration of foreign laws criminalizing the subject
of the contract.
Lord Mansfield’s famous utterance, “no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another,” occurred in an action in assump-

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

(1734) 95 Eng. Rep. 55, 55 (K.B.).
Id. at 56.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id.
Id.
(1734) 95 Eng. Rep. 55, 55 (K.B.).
Id. at 55.
Id. at 55-56.
Id. at 56.
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sit to enforce payment on a contract for the delivery of tea.16 Holman
contracted to deliver tea to Johnson in Dunkirk, France, and Johnson
intended to smuggle the tea into England in violation of England’s
tea tax.17 Johnson, without proof that Holman and his partner were
party to the smuggling scheme, offered as a defense the illegality of
smuggling the tea into England.18 Lord Mansfield, under England’s
choice of law rule, applied the law of Dunkirk and found a valid contract complete upon delivery.19 Lord Mansfield noted that the law of
contract in Dunkirk would not take notice of England’s revenue law
regarding the tea, and, with the concurrence of three other judges,
discharged the rule for a new trial.20 Domestic revenue laws were not
sufficient to void a contract construed under foreign commercial law.
An English court, applying French law to a contract case, ignored an
English tax provision to enforce the contract.
Again in 1779, Lord Mansfield applied the revenue rule in
Planche v. Fletcher.21 Planche sued an insurance company for failure
to pay a claim upon seizure and condemnation of goods shipped from
England to France.22 Because French customs duties were quite high
on goods imported from England, shipping documents indicated that
the ships stopped in Ostend before sailing to France, thus avoiding
part of the French duties.23 Fletcher claimed fraud on the underwriters, because the ship was intended to go only from London to Nantz,
without stopping in Ostend.24 Lord Mansfield found no fraud since
the practice “in this case was proved to be the constant course of the
trade, and notoriously so to everybody.”25 He further stated that
“[o]ne nation does not take notice of the revenue laws of another.”26
Yet, the decisions in these cases lacked supporting rationale and simply offered the proposition that revenue laws were not to be considered.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B.).
Id. at 1120.
Id.
Id. at 1121.
Id. at 1122.
(1779) 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 164 (K.B.).
Id.
Id. at 164-65.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 165.
Id.
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Although not usually cited as an example of one of the first appearances of the revenue rule, Lutwydge most closely annunciates the
modern version of the rule that one nation does not enforce a revenue judgment of another nation.27 The other three cases discount
both foreign and domestic revenue laws in determining whe ther a
plaintiff is entitled to have his commercial contract enforced despite
some taint of illegality. A concern for the vitality of trade and the
certainty of contractual trade agreements appears to outweigh the
English courts’ concern with the enforcement of revenue laws. That
the subject of these cases are tea that is intended to be smuggled, illegally exported gold, and false shipping documents is of particular interest in the twenty-first century when the smuggling of cigarettes and
alcohol gives rise to criminal and civil actions in U.S. courts and the
use of the revenue rule as a defense.28 The scope of the revenue rule
is broadest at this juncture, and stands for both the proposition that
the domestic or foreign revenue laws of a state will not be allowed to
interfere with commercial obligations and domestic courts will not enforce the collection of foreign taxes. This Article next examines how
courts continue to employ the revenue rule and its evolution in the
United States and other common law jurisdictions.
II. THE REVENUE RULE IN EARLY AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE
A. Early Cases
The earliest consideration of the revenue rule in the United
States occured in state court in 1806. In Ludlow v. Van Rensselaer,
the Supreme Court of New York recognized the revenue rule.29 Ludlow sought enforcement in an action of assumpsit of a promissory
note issued by Van Rensselaer in Paris.30 The note did not bear a
stamp required under French law. The maker of the note, Van Rensselaer, resided in New York, and the note was to be paid in New
York.31 The court, relying in part on Holman v. Johnson, held, “[a]s
we do not sit here to enforce the revenue laws of other countries, it is
perfectly immaterial, in a suit before us, whether or not the note was

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

(1729) 145 Eng. Rep. 674, 674 (Ex. Div.).
See discussion infra Part V.
1 Johns. 93, 94 (N.Y. 1806).
Id. at 93.
Id.
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stamped according to the laws of France.”32 The New York court,
like the English courts, was unwilling to allow a party to default on an
agreement or contract based on a defense that a foreign revenue provision was violated.
The revenue rule impacted court decisions in the United States
when individual states sought enforcement of tax levies against sister
states. State courts adopted the revenue rule as part of the common
law heritage inherited from England, and generally were reluctant to
involve themselves in the enforcement or evaluation of sister state tax
laws. Maryland and the City of Baltimore sought enforcement of a
judgment entered by the highest court in Maryland from a New York
resident who demurred and invoked the revenue rule.33 The New
York court, after analy zing taxes as contractual obligations, held that
“it is a principle universally recognized that the revenue laws of one
country have no force in another.”34 The demurrers were sustained.35
An attempt to collect inheritance taxes from non-residents fared
no better.36 A resident of Colorado died in New York, and his will
was pr obated in New York.37 Colorado had no notice of the proceedings and no provision was made to pay Colorado transfer taxes.38
Colorado asserted a tax liability against the executrix and the beneficiaries.39 The New York court first addressed the constitutional due
process implications of Colorado seeking to extract a tax on property
located outside its borders.40 The New York court then admonished
Colorado that it is a “well-settled principle of private international
law which precludes one state from acting as a collector of taxes for a
sister state and from enforcing its penal or revenue laws as such. The
rule is universally recognized that the revenue laws of one state have
no force in another.”41 The court applied a rule crafted to address ju-

32. Id. at 95.
33. Maryland v. Turner, 132 N.Y 173, 174 (1911).
34. Id. at 176 (citing Marshall v. Sherman, 42 N.E. 419 (N.Y. 1895)).
35. Id.; but see Henry v. Sargeant, 13 N.H. 321, 332-33 (1843) (recognizing the revenue rule
but accepting jurisdiction over a case seeking damages from the assessors and selectmen of the
town of Chester, Vermont upon the assertion that the town incorrectly computed the Plaintiff’s
property tax while he resided there and imprisoned him for non-payment. The court awarded
damages in the amount of the taxes).
36. Colorado v. Harbeck, 133 N.E. 357, 360 (N.Y. 1921).
37. Id. at 358.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 358-60.
41. Id. at 360.
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dicial consideration of foreign revenue laws, and applied it to the relationships between domestic states to disallow a state court from enforcing tax collection efforts of a state seeking taxes from the first
state’s residents.
Court cases decided through the 1920s demonstrate an attitude
in the judiciary that a state’s ability and decision to tax its residents
was a matter left up to each state. Yet, the courts, generally applied
the revenue rule, which originally addressed foreign taxes, to excuse
enforcement of cross-border tax obligations between states. Against
this background of state court judgments, the Second Circuit addressed the effort by one state to collect taxes in a second state, and
for the first time a justification for the revenue rule appeared.42
Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion that limits the revenue rule in the interstate context through the
application of a constitutional requirement.43 First, the Article examines the Second Circuit case setting forth the rationale for the revenue rule. The Article then presents the Supreme Court’s abrogation
of the revenue rule between sister states.
B. Learned Hand in Moore v. Mitchell44
Moore, the treasurer of Grant County, Indiana, brought suit in
federal court in New York seeking payment of a tax liability from executors of a taxpayer’s will.45 Indiana assessed taxes for a twentythree year period of residence prior to the taxpayer’s death, which occurred while he was resident in another state.46 Judge Manton, in affirming the dismissal of the action, found the effort by Indiana to collect taxes in New York “repugnant to the settled principles of private
international law, which preclude one state from acting as a collector
of taxes for a sister state, and from enforcing its penal or revenue laws
as such. The revenue laws of one state have no force in another.”47
Manton stated that the taxing power of a state is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and held, “Indiana’s political
subdivision, Grant County, is limited in the payment of taxes to property found within its boundaries.”48
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 600 (2d Cir. 1929).
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 268 (1935).
Moore, 30 F.2d at 600.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id. at 602.
Id. (citing Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71 (1921)).
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Circuit Judge Learned Hand, in a concurring opinion, expressed
for the first time a rationale for the revenue rule that is cited by both
domestic and foreign courts:
Even in the case of ordinary municipal liabilities, a court will not
recognize those arising in a foreign state, if they run counter to the
“settled public policy” of its own. Thus a scrutiny of the liability is
necessarily always in reserve, and the possibility that it will be
found not to accord with the policy of the domestic state. This is
not a troublesome or delicate inquiry when the question arises between private persons, but it takes on quite another face when it
concerns the relations between the foreign state and its own citizens
or even those who may be temporarily within its borders. To pass
upon the provisions for the public order of another state is, or at
any rate should be, beyond the powers of a court; it involves the relations between the states themselves, with which courts are incompetent to deal, and which are [e]ntrusted to other authorities. It
may commit the domestic state to a position which would seriously
embarrass its neighbor. Revenue laws fall within the same reasoning; they affect a state in matters as vital to its existence as its
criminal laws. No court ought to undertake an inquiry which it
cannot prosecute without determining whether those laws are consonant with its own notions of what is proper. 49

The English cases and the early American cases that apply the revenue rule do not offer a justification for ignoring the revenue laws of
other jurisdictions beyond a desire not to interfere with commercial
transactions and a reliance on the common law doctrine. Judge Hand
presented the first attempt to establish the rationale behind the doctrine. First, Judge Hand noted the separation of powers problem inherent in the court’s examination of the revenue statute of a foreign
state and asserted a court was not the proper government entity to
review the statutes of a foreign state.50 Second, the court would have
to reach a decision about the validity of the foreign law, and thus run
the risk of declaring the revenue law of another state unenforceable
within the jurisdiction of the court. This would violate the concept of
comity. Although the decision in Moore did not survive the Supreme
Court’s decision requiring states to extend full faith and credit to sister state tax judgments, Hand’s reasoning is often quoted by domestic
and foreign courts to support application of the revenue rule in the
international context.51

49. Moore, 30 F.2d at 604 (Hand, Cir. J., concurring).
50. The power to carry on foreign affairs is vested by the United States Constitution in the
executive and legislative branches. U.S. CONST . art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
51. See discussion infra Part II.C and Part III.
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C. Full Faith and Credit: Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co.52
On certificate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court answered the question
presented regarding whether tax judgments of sister states are entitled to Full Faith and Credit,53 and whether recovery can be denied in
state or federal courts “merely because it is for taxes.”54 Milwaukee
County brought suit in federal district court in Illinois to recover under a judgment against M. E. White Company for business license
taxes assessed under Wisconsin law.55 The district court dismissed the
cause of action on the ground that the suit was brought to enforce
revenue laws of Wisconsin in the district court of Illinois.56 The decision, however, was narrowed to judgments for taxes:
For present purposes, we will assume that the courts of one state
are not required to entertain a suit to recover taxes levied under the
statutes of another, and confine our inquiry to . . . whether they
must, nevertheless, give full faith and credit to judgments for such
taxes.57

It is noteworthy that revenue statutes of sister states are not
granted full faith and credit, but rather the decision is specifically addressed to judgments for taxes. Judgments based on tax liabilities are
not open to inquiry under this decision except on limited grounds: (1)
the court issuing the judgment was without jurisdiction, (2) the judgment debt was previously discharged, (3) the cause of action resulting
in judgment for which the state of the forum has not provided a court,
and (4) possibly fraud.58
This abrogation of the revenue rule in the face of a judgment
does not, however, apply to foreign judgments. The purpose of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause was to change the status of states as
completely independent actors and make the states “integral parts” of
one nation.59 The Supreme Court’s abrogation of the revenue rule
only after a judgment has been entered in the taxing state may be ex-

52. 296 U.S. 268, 268 (1935).
53. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
54. M. E. White Co, 296 U.S. at 279.
55. Id. at 269-70.
56. Id. at 270.
57. Id. at 275.
58. Id. at 275-76 (listing cases with holdings that form exceptions to the rule that a state
must recognize the judgment of a sister state).
59. Id. at 276-77.

03_MALLINAK.DOC

88

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/1/2006 12:51 PM

[Vol 16:79

plained by the principle of comity articulated by Judge Hand.60 If the
taxing state has procured a judicial judgment, the taxpayer has received due process and the enforcement of the judgment, as opposed
to determining the tax that should be due under a sister state’s revenue laws. This removes the enforcing court from an obligation to review the taxing state’s statute. The enforcing court is not put in the
position that concerned Judge Hand of having to sit in judgment of
the wisdom or fairness of another state’s revenue laws. Rather, the
laws are presumed fair once a judgment has been entered by a court.
In light of M.E. White Co., it is clear that state court judgments for
taxes are enforceable in sister states, and the enforcement of mere
levies or assessments rests in the state court’s discretion.61
The Supreme Court only recently issued an opinion in a criminal
case considering the revenue rule and remanded to the Second Circuit a case that required the application of the revenue rule in the
context of a suit for taxes, directly or indirectly sought, by a foreign
state.62 To assess the vitality of the revenue rule in the international
sphere one must look first to lower court decisions in the United
States and, by analogy, other common law jurisdictions to trace its
evolution. The Supreme Court considered these domestic and foreign decisions when it determined the applicability of the revenue
rule to criminal prosecutions.63
III. REVENUE RULE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
A. Common Law Jurisdictions Outside North America
British courts have dealt with the revenue rule in two distinct
permutations: the enforcement of contracts when a revenue rule im60. See Henry v. Sargeant, 13 N.H. 321, 332-33, 338 (1843). A New Hampshire court required the clerk of Chester, Vermont, to testify regarding the preparation of tax lists. The court
found the lists improperly prepared and entered a judgment for a tax refund to Henry. This was
a clear violation of the revenue rule’s purposes as articulated by Hand: the court undertook an
analysis of a sister state’s taxing authority and taxing procedures and issued a judgment based
on a finding of shortcomings therein. Id.
61. See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Neely, 282 S.W.2d 150, 151-52
(Ark. 1955); Detroit v. Gould, 146 N.E.2d 61, 63-64 (Ill. 1957); Ohio ex rel. Duffy v. Arnett, 234
S.W.2d 722, 726 (Ky. 1950); State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d 919,
927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946); State Tax Comm’n v. Cord, 404 P.2d 422, 425 (Nev. 1965); Buckley v.
Huston, 291 A.2d 129, 131 (N.J. 1972); Nelson v. Minn. Income Tax Div., 429 P.2d 324, 325
(Wyo. 1967).
62. See Pasqunatino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1766 (2005); European Cmty. v. RJR
Nabisco, 125 S. Ct. 1968, 1968 (2005).
63. Pasqunatino, 125 S.Ct. at 1175 and n.7.
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pacts the legality of the undertaking, and actions that directly or indirectly seek revenue for a foreign state. The first set of cases falls under the early decisions by Lord Hardwicke and Lord Mansfield that
revenue laws are not considered by other states. The British courts
did not apply the revenue rule to salvage agreements to sell goods
that were intended to be smuggled in contravention of the foreign
state’s export restrictions or a ban on the goods intended for import.64
Contracts would be found void as against public policy after the argument raising the revenue rule was discounted since the prohibition
and export control laws at issue were not revenue laws.65 The U.S.
ban on alcohol and Indian export law aimed at South Africa did not
raise revenues for the legislating countries, and the ruling courts, as a
matter of public policy, declined to enforce the contracts underlying
illegal acts. Additionally, the cases questioned whether the earlier
decisions enforcing contracts despite their illegality under the nonrevenue laws of the nations where the transactions occurred—if tried
currently—would not result in a different outcome in part because of
changing public policy concerns.66 The dicta from the early cases has
survived as a common law doctrine with far reaching ramifications
and continued application by the British courts. Yet, as discussed below, the decisions rendered in the early cases establishing the rule
have been undermined by the House of Lords.
The British courts preserved the doctrine in the context of revenue laws. The British courts stand firmly behind Lord Mansfield’s
statement that “no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of
another.”67 An English court construed an action brought by the
Municipal Council of Sydney for property assessments as an action
“in the nature of an action for a penalty or to recover a tax; it is
analogous to an action brought in one country to enforce the revenue
64. Foster v. Driscoll, [1929] 1 K.B. 470, 515 (A.C. 1928) (appeal taken from Eng.) (British
citizens including a member of Parliament entered into a contract to purchase whiskey for import into the United States during prohibition. The Court found the United States law was not a
revenue law and the contract void as against public policy); Regazzoni v. Sethia, [1958] A.C.
301, 302 (H.L. 1957) (appeal taken from Eng.) (Sethia agreed to sell Regazonni jute bags for
import into South Africa in contravention of Indian export laws. Sethia repudiated the contract
and Sethia sued for enforcement. The House of Lords found the contract unenforceable under
Foster v. Driscoll).
65. See Foster, [1929] 1 K.B. at 515; Regazzoni, [1958] A.C. at 322.
66. See Regazzoni, [1958] A.C. at 320-22; Gov’t of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, 513-14
(H.L. 1955); Foster, [1929] 1 K.B. at 515-16. One of the early cases, for instance, involved smuggling gold from Portugal in violation of Portuguese export laws. Boucher v. Lawson, (1734) 95
Eng. Rep. 55, 55 (K.B.).
67. Holman, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1121.
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laws of another,” despite the statute’s provision for a cause of action
to pursue the claim under Australian law.68 The court noted that “it
has always been held that an action will not lie outside the confines of
the last-mentioned State,” and dismissed the appeal to be properly
pursued in the courts of Australia.69 Courts extended the revenue
rule to ana logous laws that generated revenue for the foreign state.
The King of Greece sued for funds held by a British bank to satisfy payments due on currency exchanges; the court dismissed the suit
because, “[i]t is perfectly elementary that a foreign government cannot come here . . . and sue a person found in that jurisdiction for taxes
levied.”70 When the Queen of Holland sought to collect succession
duties through the English legal system, the court posited, “[t]he
question is really, are the English Courts to be collectors of taxes for
foreign governments?”71 The court answered the question by finding
that Municipal Council of Sydney established the rule, and it was also
a well recognized rule for over two hundred years that courts will not
collect foreign taxes.72 Based on these precedents, the revenue rule
squarely stands for the idea that courts will not act as collection agencies for foreign governments seeking taxes assessed against citizens
within the court’s jurisdiction. These cases were decided with little
discussion of the rationale behind the rule. The House of Lords
remedied this in a suit brought by the Indian government.
In 1955, the Government of India sought income and capital gain
taxes from a company that failed to pay its taxes upon liquidation.
The House of Lords applied the revenue rule despite “remarkably little authority upon the subject” and set forth three justifications for
the rule.73 Lord Keith asserted that national sovereignty precluded
the collection of taxes for another nation positing “that enforcement
of a claim for taxes is but an extension of the sovereign power which
imposed the taxes, and that an assertion of sovereign authority by one

68. Mun. Council of Sydney v. Bull, [1909] 1 K.B. 7, 12 (A.C. 1908) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (A British resident owned property upon which improvements were made by the city, and
a law was passed that assessed each property owner for a share of the cost of the improvements.
The law allowed an action to be brought against the owner of the property for the cost.).
69. Id. at 12-13.
70. King of the Hellenes v. Brostrom, [1923] 16 Lloyd’s List L.R. 190, 193 (appeal taken
from K.B.D.) (Eng.).
71. Queen of Holland v. Drukker, [1928] 1 Ch. 877, 879 (appeal taken from Eng.) (The
Queen was a creditor of the estate on property transferred in England under the will of a Dutch
citizen).
72. Id. at 883-84.
73. Gov’t of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, 504-14 (H.L. 1955).
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State within the territory of another . . . [is] contrary to all concepts of
independent sovereignties.”74 Based on Judge Hand’s opinion in
Moore, Lord Keith considered that scrutiny of a foreign state’s revenue law may offend the state and, therefore, should be avoided.75
Lord Somervell offered a third justification based on administrative
difficulties stating that “[i]f one considers the initial stages of the
process, which may . . . be intricate and prolonged, it would be remarkable comity if State B allowed the time of its courts to be expended in assisting in this regard the tax gatherers of State A.”76
These justifications have been adopted to replace the blanket statement made by Lord Mansfield as sufficient to restrain courts from accepting jurisdiction over cases brought by governments to collect tax
liabilities arising in foreign states.
An Irish court, a common law jurisdiction, and a British court
have extended the doctrine to apply to the indirect collection of taxes
for a governmental entity. Whether the suit is initiated by the government as a cause of action for bankruptcy77 or a third party seeks to
avoid payment on a contract because taxes will be assessed by a foreign government, courts in common law jurisdictions have relied on
the revenue rule to decline jurisdiction over the bankruptcy and order
payment on the contract.78 The justifications enunciated in Taylor
74. Id. at 511. Extradition is available for taxpayers who commit criminal violation of
revenue rules. See Zagaris, infra note 196.
75. Id. at 511-12.
76. Id. at 514.
77. Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. McVey, [1954] Ir. 89 (1951) (S.C.). Bankruptcy proceedings
were brought against a Scottish Company by the Scottish government. The only debt was taxes
that resulted from a retroactive 100% tax on excessive profits. The owner of the company paid
off the commercial debts of the company and moved to Ireland with the remaining funds without paying the tax. The Irish Court found the transfer of the assets fraudulent but were unwilling to consider the retroactive revenue statute under the analysis of Judge Hand. Id. at 105.
The court further justified its adoption of the rule:
Nor is modern history without examples of revenue laws used for purposes which
would not only affront the strongest feelings of neighbouring communities but would
run counter to their political aims and vital interests. Such laws have been used for religious and racial discrimination; for the furtherance of social policies and ideals da ngerous to the security of adjacent countries; and for the direct furtherance of economic
warfare. So long as these possibilities exist, it would be equally unwise for Courts to
permit the enforcement of the revenue claims of foreign States.
Id. at 107 (Moore, J.).
78. In Rossano v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., (1963) 2 Q.B. 352 (Eng.), Rossano, an Egyptian businessman, took out endowment policies when war threatened Egypt in 1940. At the maturity of
the policies he attempted to collect two policies in London as provided in the contracts. The insurance company refused payment because payment to Rossano was illegal under Egyptian law
without permission of the Egyptian authorities and garnishee orders were served by Egyptian
revenue authorities and were not satisfied. The court held that there was no direct or indirect
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support this comprehensive practice of declining to engage in an
evaluation of the revenue laws of a foreign state or acting as a collection mechanism for foreign revenue agencies. These justifications include: (1) comity precludes sitting in judgment of foreign states’ public laws, (2) enforcement of taxes of another state is an extension of
that state’s sovereignty, and (3) courts should avoid the administrative difficulties of interpreting another state’s revenue laws.79 Canadian and United States courts adopted this reasoning when assessing
circumstances appropriate for the application of the revenue rule.
B. Canada
The Supreme Court of Canada applied the revenue rule in
United States v. Harden.80 The United States sought enforcement of a
tax judgment entered in federal district court in California against a
United States citizen residing in British Columbia.81 The British Columbian court refused to enforce the judgment, relying on the three
reasons articulated in Taylor to justify its decision.82 The Supreme
Court upheld the lower court’s refusal of jurisdiction and dismissed
the appeal.83
In 1992, the Alberta Court of Appeal relied on Harden, Taylor,
and Hand’s opinion in Moore to refuse indemnification of an executor of an United States’ estate for transfer taxes on property in Canada.84 Despite criticism of Harden, Canada considers the enforcement of tax judgments to be outside the jurisdiction of the judicial
system. The United States considered the Canadian interpretation of
the revenue rule when it first faced the issue.
C. United States
As noted above, the only ruling related to the enforcement of
foreign revenue laws in the United States was issued by a state court
in 1806.85 The court adopted Lord Mansfield’s idea that a foreign

enforcement of revenue laws of a foreign country, and the payments due under the policies were
to be paid to Rossano in England. Id. at 377.
79. Gov’t of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, 511-12 (H.L. 1955).
80. [1963] 41 D.L.R. 2d 721.
81. Id. at 722; but see supra text accompanying notes 101-05 se tting forth treaty terms altering this outcome.
82. Id. at 724-26.
83. Id. at 727.
84. Stringham v. Dubois, [1992] 135 A.R. 64, 68-71 (Alta. Ct. App.).
85. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns 93, 94 (N.Y. 1806).
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revenue law should not interfere with the enforcement of a commercial contract.86 By the late twentieth century, it was clear that the law
of the forum state controls a suit by a foreign state to collect a tax
judgment.87 Additionally, domestic courts generally recognize foreign
judgments when general principles of comity, as set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in Hilton v. Guyot, are met.88 Yet, the enforcement of a judgment for tax liability was not addressed until the
late twentieth century.89
Canada sought enforcement of a certificate of assessment that
had the same effect as the judgment of a court for taxes assessed
against Oregon residents who engaged in logging in British Columbia
and then failed to pay the logging tax on the income.90 The Ninth Circuit recognized that tax judgments were considered under the revenue rule, and that recognition of a foreign judgment was based on reciprocity with the claiming jurisdiction.91 Additionally, the Ninth
Circuit reported that no other case of a foreign government seeking
enforcement of a tax judgment had been presented to an American
court, attributing this to the strength of the revenue rule.92 The court
relied on Judge Hand’s discussion of the purpose of the revenue rule
to find justification for not enfor cing a foreign tax judgment.93 The
court also examined a Supreme Court case declining to interfere with
86. Id.
87. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (deciding the law of
the forum state governs an action in diversity); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
487, 496 (1941) (applying conflicts of law rules of the forum state to actions in diversity).
88. Comity between nations would require a recognition of a foreign judgment:
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court
of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due
citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show
either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or
fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of
this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an
action brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial
or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895). The modern version of these requirements have
been codified in the Uniform Foreign Monetary Judgments Act, see infra note 279.
89. British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979).
90. Id. at 1162.
91. Id. at 1163-64. The court found the lack of reciprocity sufficient to refuse to recognize
British Columbia’s judgment. See also discussion of Harden, supra text accompanying notes 8083.
92. Id. at 1164.
93. Id. at 1164-65.
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the application of a penal law by a foreign country and discussions by
two Justices of the revenue rule in the same context.94 The Ninth Circuit concluded:
The revenue rule has been with us for centuries and as such has become firmly embedded in the law. There were sound reasons which
supported its original adoption, and there remain sound reasons
supporting its continued validity. When and if the rule is changed,
it is a more proper function of the policy-making branches of our
government to make such a change.95

It seems clear that to present a tax liability for collection it must be
reduced to a judgment that would be recognized under state law.96 As
noted by both Judge Hand and the Ninth Circuit, the decision to recognize tax judgments from foreign governments should rest with the
legislature and/or the executive branch of government.97 Tax treaties
are the proper mechanism for creating reciprocal recognition of
judgments for tax liabilities.98 Bilateral agreements regarding recognition of such judgments address the concerns raised by Hand in
Moore and by Taylor.99 This solution has not, however, been widely
adopted by the United States.
IV. TREATIES
The revenue rule can be abrogated in an agreement between the
United States and another country through a treaty.100 The United
States has entered into income tax treaties with many countries providing for information exchange, but only five treaties provide for
general assistance in collecting tax judgments against citizens of the
contracting nations.101 Early treaties with Denmark, France, Sweden,

94. Id. at 1165 (citing the majority opinion and Justice White’s dissent regarding the reluctance of courts to give effect to revenue laws of foreign countries. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 413-14, 448, 450 n.11 (1964)).
95. Id. at 1166.
96. This is true in the interstate context also, although some states have permitted actions
for tax assessments without requiring that they be reduced to judgment. See cases cited supra
note 61.
97. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929); Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1166.
98. See e.g., Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103,
115 (2d Cir. 2001).
99. Moore, 30 F.2d at 604; Gov’t of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, 511-12, 514 (H.L.
1955).
100. See Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1165.
101. Canada, 268 F.3d at 115-16.

03_MALLINAK.DOC

2006]

3/1/2006 12:51 PM

THE REVENUE RULE

95

and the Netherlands provided for tax collection assistance.102 These
treaties were ratified in the 1930s and 1940s, but by 1947 the Senate
was not entirely pleased with collection efforts on behalf of the
French government.103 Consequently, the terms of the treaty with
France were amended in 1949 to limit enforcement requests to collect
taxes owed to the requesting state only and not to allow the requesting state to pursue collection efforts against the citizens of the requested state.104
In 1951, the Senate declined to ratify provisions negotiated by
the executive branch that provided for collection assistance in treaties
with Greece, Norway, and South Africa.105 Subsequent agreements
with Canada, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands have articles
that provide:
2. In the case of applications for enforcement of taxes, revenue
claims of each of the States which have been fully determined may
be accepted for enforcement by the other State and collected in
that state in accordance with the laws applicable to the enforcement
and collection of it own taxes. The State to which application is

102. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Neth., art. 31, Dec. 18, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 457 (1993)
(entered into force Dec. 31, 1993); see also Protocol Amending the Convention With Respect to
Taxes on Income and on Capital of September 26, 1980, U.S.-Can., art. 15, Mar. 17, 1995, 2030
U.N.T.S. 236 (entered into force Nov. 9, 1995) [hereinafter Canada -U.S. 1995 Protocol]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Den., art. 27, Aug. 19, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-12 (entered
into force Mar. 31, 2000): Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Fr., art. 28, Aug. 31,
1994, 1963 U.N.T.S 67 (entered into force Dec. 30, 1995); Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.Sweden, art. 27, Sept. 1, 1994, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-29 (entered into force Oct. 26, 1995).
103. Senator Smith , a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in a floor
statement in 1948 discussed the concern the Senate had with the treaty with France:
[I]n 1947 attention was focused on the mutual collection assistance provisions of the
treaty with France, and the Committee discovered that there had been developed . . . a
number of objections as to the way by which, under the convention, our country unde rtook to collect taxes for the government of France. This matter was of such concern
that we held a number of hearings [and recommended consultation between individuals, businesses and interest groups concerned about the treaty and State Department
representatives]. We discovered that there had been embodied in the convention certain methods of colle ction of taxes which we as a subcommittee felt were not desirable,
and at our request the whole matter was reviewed again by the State Department re presentatives.
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, 1 Legislative History of United States
Tax Conventions 1152 (1962) (cited in Canada , 268 F.3d at 116).
104. Canada, 268 F.3d at 116 (citing Staff of the Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation,
1 Legislative History of United States Tax Conventions 1152 (1962); Supplementary Protocol to
the Convention about Double Taxation and Fiscal Assistance, May 17, 1948).
105. Id. at 116-17 & n.13.
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made shall not be required to enforce executory measures for
which there is no provision in the law of the State making the application.
3. Any application shall be accompanied by documents establishing
that under the laws of the State making the application the taxes
have been finally determined.
4. The assistance provided for in this Article shall not be accorded
with respect to the citizens, corporations, or other entities of the
State to which application is made, except in cases where the exemption or reduced rate of tax granted under the Convention to
such citizens, corporations or other entities has, according to mutual agreement between the competent authorities of the State,
been enjoyed by persons not entitled to such bene fits. 106

This article limits the collection efforts undertaken by the parties to
collect tax claims presented by the requesting country against its own
citizens and does not provide a mechanism for collecting taxes owed
to the foreign government by a citizen of the other State. The application of the treaty with Canada under this article was presented in a
case brought by a Canadian citizen seeking to have a tax lien imposed
by the Internal Revenue Service upon a request by the Canadian
government set aside.107 The court reviewed the provisions of the
treaty and refused to interfere with the tax lien as proper under the
terms of the treaty.108 The treaty obligation created an exception to
the revenue rule that the court properly recognized.
The United States Model Income Tax Convention of September
1996 contains no general provision for assistance in collection of foreign tax judgments or claims.109 Likewise, the United States has ratified the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Convention on Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters only with
a reservation to Article 27110 that provides for assistance in collecting
106. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, U.S.-Neth, supra note 102 at
art. XXX. The language here is quoted from the treaty with the Netherlands; the wording of the
other tre aties with Canada, Sweden, and Denmark varies slightly but the content is virtually
identical.
107. Tesher v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 2d 297, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
108. Id. at 299-300.
109. Attorney Gen. of Can v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 118 n.4
(2d Cir. 2001).
110. Article 27, paragraph 3 provides:
When a revenue claim of a Contracting State is enforceable under the laws of that
State and is owed by a person, who at that time, cannot, under the laws of that State,
prevent its collection, that revenue claim shall, at the request of the competent authority of that State, be accepted for purposes of collection by that other State in accordance with the prov isions of its laws applicable to the enforcement and colle ction of its
own taxes as if the revenue claim were a revenue claim of that other State.
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tax judgments and claims.111 The vitality of the revenue rule is demonstrated by the reluctance of the Senate and the State Department
to enter into agreements that abrogate the revenue rule and provide
for collection of tax claims except under limited circumstances and
not against citizens of the United States with tax liabilities in arrears
to foreign countries. The mechanism for so doing is available as
demonstrated in the early twentieth century treaties with France,
Sweden, and the Netherlands, and as demonstrated in the OECD
Convention on Mutual Assistance; but it is clear that the legislative
and executive branches of the government are presently unwilling to
enter into broad enforcement agreements.
The judiciary, limited by the revenue rule, cannot sua sponte engage in the recognition of foreign tax claims. The reluctance of the
executive and legislative branches may represent an underutilization
of treaties to facilitate the collection of United States taxes from persons who are citizens of the United States, or a fear that the provision
would be used primarily against United States residents. But the present treaty protocol of the United States disallows the collection of
foreign tax debts or foreign tax judgments against United States citizens. The reverse is also true as to the United States’ ability to collect
taxes through foreign court systems. This reluctance may be due, in
part, to the reasons that support the revenue rule: a reluctance to accept foreign revenue laws as in keeping with the United States public
policy stance and a desire to avoid an evaluation of a foreign revenue
law that risks offending the foreign state. The inclusion of collection
procedures for foreign taxes also presents the problem that the laws
in place when the treaty was signed may change and public policy issues may again assert themselves after the ratification of the treaty. It
is clear that the executive and legislative branches working together
could abrogate the revenue rule through treaties yet they are unwilling to do so.
V. CURRENT CASES
By the end of the twentieth century, it became clear that courts
in the United States recognize the revenue rule as a common law doctrine that pe rmits courts to decline jurisdiction over attempts by a
foreign sovereign to collect tax debts without a specific agreement between governments. This settled doctrine reasserted itself in the last
Phillip Burgess, Globilization Comes to Tax Collection, 34 TAX N OTES INT’L, 645, 650 (2004).
111. Id.; Canada, 268 F.3d at 118.
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decade of the twentieth century as a defense to suits brought against
persons involved in illegal activities. The high taxes imposed on cig arettes and alcohol create a temptation to the dishonest to circumvent
the duties and pocket what would otherwise be revenue to a foreign
government. Federal statutory provisions allow at least two avenues
of attack against smuggling operations engaged in by United States
citizens. If the pa rties communicate over interstate wires, they can be
prosecuted in federal court for violation of the wire fraud statute.112
Or the parties injured can pursue relief under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) statute.113 Defendants
in both criminal and civil suits have invoked the revenue rule as a bar
to the judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court issued an opinion
that considered the scope of the revenue rule in a criminal case and,
upon a petition for certiorari, remanded one of the RICO suits to the
Second Circuit for reconsideration.114
A. RICO Cases
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. (Reynolds), in response to
the Canadian government’s doubling of the tobacco tax, engaged in
elaborate schemes that involved exporting Canadian cig arettes and
tobacco under false declarations, manufacturing the tobacco into Canadian cigarettes in Puerto Rico and then smuggling the cigarettes
through free-trade zones or Indian reservations back into Canada.115
Canada brought an action in a United States court under the U.S.
civil RICO statutes116 seeking damages from Reynolds based on lost

112.
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire . . . . communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).
113. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2000).
114. Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1766, 1766 (2005); European Cmty v. RJR Nabisco, 125 S.Ct. 1968, 1968 (2005).
115. Canada, 268 F.3d at 106-07. R.J. Reynolds’ Canadian distribution subsidiary and several individuals pled guilty to mail and wire fraud relating to the smuggling activities that are the
subject of Canada’s RICO suit.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2000). Section 1962 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly,
any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
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tax revenues and additional law enforcement costs.117 The Second
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for failure to state a claim, as
a suit based on the avoidance of foreign taxes was precluded under
the revenue rule.118 The Second Circuit first determined the validity
of the revenue rule and then acknowledged the rationales advanced
in federal and foreign cases prevented Canada from utilizing the
RICO statutes to recover its revenue losses or the cost of enforcing its
revenue laws in United States courts.119 A “long standing common
law doctrine prov iding that courts of one sovereign will not enforce
final tax judgments or unadjudicated claims of other sovereigns” supported a finding of validity.120 Despite the lack of a Supreme Court
case addressing the revenue rule in the international context, the
court found that the Supreme Court had acknowledged the continuing validity of the doctrine in a number of decisions cited by the
court.121 International acceptance of the revenue rule included Canada, as made evident in the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in
Harden, where the rule was invoked to prevent the enforcement of a
United States judgment for taxes.122
The court adopted the three grounds for adhering to the revenue
rule articulated in Taylor. First, the “rule prevents foreign sovereigns
from asserting their sovereignty within the borders of other nations.”123 As Judge Hand explained in Moore, the concept of comity
prevents courts from reviewing the public policy underlying a nation’s
choice of revenue law.124 The court noted that addressing such public
policy concerns “could embroil United States courts in delicate issues

(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. Id.
117. Canada, 268 F.3d at 105-06.
118. Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 134,
144 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
119. Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 109 (2d
Cir. 2001).
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing, inter alia, Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 740 n.3 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 413-14 (1964)).
122. Canada, 268 F.3d at 111 n.5 (citing Harden, [1963] S.C.R. at 371).
123. Id. at 111-12 (citing Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 448 (White, J., dissenting on other
grounds)).
124. Id. at 112 (citing, inter alia, Moore, 30 F.2d at 604 (L. Hand, J., concurring).
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in which they have little expertise or capacity.”125 Without any discussion, the court noted that past rulings suggested that an analysis of
foreign revenue laws was difficult, a ground for the rule advanced in
Taylor.126
Having recognized the rule, the court acknowledged that governments could arrange to aid each other in the collection of tax
debts; but, under the concept of separation of powers, this needed to
be accomplished by the executive and legislative branches:
[E]xtraterritorial tax enforcement directly implicates relations between our country and other sovereign nations. When a foreign nation appears as a plaintiff in our courts seeking enforcement of its
revenue laws, the judiciary risks being drawn into issues and disputes of foreign relations policy that are assigned to - and better
handled by—the political branches of government.127

The court recognized the restriction in the Canadian-U.S. 1995 Protocol as only limiting requests for “finally determined” revenue claims
against the requesting country’s citizens.128 The court properly noted
two impediments under the treaty to judicial enforcement of the tax
liability: (1) the treaty barred collection of Canadian tax from a
United States citizen or corporation; and (2) the taxes sought were
not finally determined under a judicial procedure within Canada.129
Despite the fact that Canada was not asking for direct enforcement of
a tax liability, it is clear that the revenue rule precludes indirect efforts to collect a tax.130 The court concluded by expressing its regret
that it was unable to right an alleged wrong but found itself “without
license to abandon unilaterally the centuries-old, albeit sharply attacked, revenue rule.”131
Judge Calabresi attacked the decision and the revenue rule in his
dissent and opined that the RICO statutes allowed suits based on lost
tax revenue because the damages were based on a United States statute and not on Canadian revenue laws.132 Calabresi examined the justifications presented by the majority for the revenue rule and found

125. Id. at 113 (finding the tobacco tax based on Canada’s public health concerns and at
least arguably contrary to the interests of some United States citizens and raising other hypothetical examples where foreign public policy would diverge from American interests).
126. Id. at 112; see Gov’t of India v. Taylor, [1955] A.C. 491, 514 (H.L. 1955).
127. Canada, 268 F.3d at 113-14.
128. Canada-U.S. 1995 Protocol, supra note 102, art. 15, ¶ 8, 2.
129. Canada, 268 F.3d at 120-21.
130. Id. at 130-31.
131. Id. at 134.
132. Id. at 135 (Calabresi, J. dissenting).
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them not applicable to Canada’s use of the RICO statutes. Sovereignty, according to Judge Calabesi, is not and cannot be implicated
by a suit brought under a U.S. statute.133 The dissent also asserted
that separation of powers is not violated if a suit is brought under le gislation enacted by the United States Congress and signed into law by
the President.134 Calabresi noted, with approval, the use of foreign
revenue laws to determine the extent of damages and recognized it as
the strongest argument against entertaining the suit.135 Nevertheless,
Calabresi found that this obstacle was overcome by the Second Circuit’s rejection of the argument in the context of criminal prosecutions under the wire fraud statute.136 Calabresi concluded that he
cannot “join an opinion that applies an old and dubious common law
rule, in ways that have nothing to do with its roots or rationales, in
order to limit an Act of Congress that the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied in the broadest possible ways.”137
Although Judge Calabresi makes valid arguments regarding the
scope of the RICO statutes and the reduced perception of an extension of sovereignty by a foreign government into United States courts
when a statute passed by the legislature and signed by the executive
invites suit by those injured by a conspiracy, the majority has the better position. Despite the breadth of the RICO statutes, they do not
address the direct or indirect collection of foreign taxes, although the
revenue rule existed at the time the statutes were enacted. Collection
of foreign taxes under the RICO statutes presents the same problems
that direct suit for enforcement of a judgment presents: The court is
faced with deciding whether a foreign revenue law should be upheld
in a domestic court without significant input from the other branches
of the government, and the court is placed in the position of having to
decipher foreign revenue laws and risk offending foreign states.
Without clear intent in the RICO statutes that the legislature and ex-

133. Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 136 (2d
Cir. 2001).
134. See id. at 136-37 (noting that the court s are merely implementing foreign policy as decided by the other branches).
135. Id. at 137.
136. Id. at 137-38. See United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 549 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding a
scheme nearly identical to the present acts to defraud the Canadian government of tax revenue
cognizable under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000), the wire fraud statute, because success was not required for prosecution); United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 165 (2d. Cir. 2000) (finding the
same, but court held prosecution must prove a property right—the right to revenue—of which
Canada could be defrauded).
137. Canada, 268 F.3d at 140.
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ecutive branches intended courts to undertake such analysis and decision-making tasks, the revenue rule stands to protect the courts from
those undertakings. The RICO statutes, as concluded by the majority, run afoul of the separation of powers and comity concerns of the
revenue rule.138 To a lesser extent, the difficulty of interpreting foreign revenue laws was also presented, but the panel as a whole was
less concerned with this aspect.
Canada was not the only victim of the tobacco companies’ smuggling schemes, and other governments brought RICO suits seeking
redress for their lost taxes. The Republics of Ecuador, Belize, and
Honduras made allegations of wide-spread smuggling operations and
brought suit against Philip Morris in the Eleventh Circuit, which
adopted the revenue rule as the law of that circuit and found that, in
civil RICO and state common law actions, abstention was required.139
The European Community and the Republic of Columbia initially
won a motion to dismiss based on a defense of the revenue rule in a
civil RICO action against Philip Morris, RJR Nabisco, Inc. and Japan
Tobacco, Inc. in the Eastern District of New York.140 The court’s ruling that “the revenue rule is not implicated in this case,” was made
without benefit of the Second Circuit’s ruling in Canada, and the district court found the revenue rule applicable under the earlier Second
Circuit decision to disregard the revenue rule in federal wire fraud
and mail fraud prosecutions.141 A renewed motion to dismiss was
granted when the district court acquiesced, as it must, to the Second
Circuit’s ruling in Canada.142 On appeal,143 the European Community
asserted that Congress abrogated the revenue rule as applied to the
RICO statutes when the PATRIOT Act144 was enacted. 145 The Second Circuit found no clear intent by Congress to abrogate the reve-

138. Id. at 126, 134–35.
139. Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 341 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003).
140. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
141. Id. at 471.
142. European Cmty. v. Japan Tobacco, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 231, 241 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
143. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2004), cert pending .
Judge Calabresi was assigned to the panel hearing this case and, although he continued in his
belief that Canada was not correctly decided, he recognized that he was bound by the precedent
established in that case. Id. at 132; n.4.
144. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272.
145. European Cmty., 355 F.3d at 127.
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nue rule and, upon the reasoning set forth in Canada, the district
court’s decision was affirmed. 146
A petition for certiorari was recently filed in the United States
Supreme Court presenting the question of the applicability of the
revenue rule to “claims brought under U. S. domestic law seeking equitable relief to enjoin and remedy smuggling schemes based in the
United States.”147 The petition asserts that the Second Circuit breaks
new ground by applying the revenue rule to a suit that does not directly seek taxes but instead seeks injunctive and equitable relief, and
that the revenue rule is not applicable to suits bought under U.S. domestic law.148 Since courts, including the Se cond Circuit, apply the
revenue rule to attempts to collect taxes both directly and indirectly,
the argument that the Second Circuit’s ruling denied the Plaintiffs
equitable relief does not appear to raise a serious challenge to the
dismissal of the European Community’s and the Republic of Columbia’s claims. But, as requested in their petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court awaited its decision in the federal wire fraud cases before deciding whether to hear argument in the RICO cases.149
B. Wire Fraud Cases
A conviction for wire fraud requires proof of a scheme to defraud and use of wire communication to further that scheme.150 Wire
fraud violations are limited to schemes that attempt to deprive another of money or property.151 In 1994, federal prosecutors in Maine
indicted Native Americans who used Indian reservations as staging
grounds for liquor smuggling activities into Canada, thereby depriving Canada of excise and sales tax.152 In United States v. Boots, the
First Circuit reversed the convictions for wire fraud imposed by the

146. Id. at 132-35.
147. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 125 S. Ct.
1968 (2005) (No. 03–1427). The petition suggested that the petition be held for the outcome in,
United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) cert. granted, 124 St. Ct.
1875 (2004), a federal wire fraud case. Id. at 27. The Fourth Circuit overturned a panel decision
in an en banc rehearing to find the revenue not implicated and the Supreme Court affirmed.
See infra discussion part V(B).
148. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–11, European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 125 S. Ct.
1968 (2005) (No. 03–1427).
149. Id. at 8; European Cmty., 125 S.Ct. at 1968.
150. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000); United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 407 (4th Cir. 2001).
151. McNally v. United States, 482 U.S. 350, 356 (1987).
152. United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 583-84 (1st Cir. 1996).
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district court.153 The court, in finding the revenue rule applicable, discerned that the conviction did not enforce the revenue laws of Canada, but “upholding defendants’ section 1343 conviction would
amount functionally to penal enforcement of Canadian customs and
tax laws.”154 The court looked at two justifications for the revenue
rule: comity and separation of powers. The court held that in order to
uphold the convictions it would have to consider challenges made by
the defendants to Canadian law and determine if such laws were
valid, and then determine how the statutes operated in the case before it, a violation of the revenue rule’s rationale against interfering
with the public laws of a foreign state, or comity.155 As to separation
of powers, the court noted that the federal smuggling statutes punish
“such activities only if the foreign government has a reciprocal law.”
156
The participation of the executive branch in bringing the prosecution was insufficient to satisfy the separation of powers concern and a
decision as to whether conduct is criminal (because it is aimed at a
particular country) cannot be left solely to prosecutorial discretion.157
The First Circuit found no proof of a scheme to defraud another of
money or property was possible in a scheme to evade excise and sales
taxes when the revenue rule excluded consideration of the revenue
laws of a foreign country.158 Later courts find this to be a misapplication of the revenue rule and come to different results.159
At the same time as Boots was wending its way through the First
Circuit, federal prosecutors indicted Trapilo and others under the
federal wire fraud statute for smuggling alcohol and cigarettes
through a Mohawk reservation in upstate New York.160 The district
court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment in reliance on Boots, and the Second Circuit reversed and remanded.161
The Second Circuit briefly considered the revenue rule and noted
that its purpose was to maintain the separation of powers between the
branches of government and international relations properly be-

153. Id. at 595.
154. Id. at 587.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 588; see 18 U.S.C. § 546.
157. Boots, 80 F.3d at 588.
158. Id. at 587.
159. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 547; United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 324-25 (4th Cir.
2003) (en banc), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1875 (2004).
160. Id. at 549.
161. Id. at 553.
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longed to the executive and legislative branches.162 The court decided
the common law revenue rule was not properly implicated by the wire
fraud statute because “at the heart of the indictment is the misuse of
the wires in furthe rance of a scheme to defraud the Canadian government of tax revenue, not the validity of a foreign sovereign’s revenue laws,” and “identity and location of the victim and the success of
the scheme is irrelevant.”163 Upon a scanty review of the rule, the
court found that the federal statute proscribed criminal activity within
the United States, and the fact that the fraud was aimed at a foreign
government’s revenue laws did not negate the fraudulent act within
the United States.164
A third wire fraud persecution addressed the circuit split between the First and Second Circuits. The First Circuit decision, implicating the revenue rule and reversing wire fraud convictions when
the purpose of the fraud was to evade Canadian taxes on liquor, was
disregarded in the Se cond Circuit’s holding that the federal wire fraud
statute is complete unto itself without consideration of foreign revenue statutes. This dichotomy was present in a wire fraud case
brought in Maryland.165 The United States indicted David and Carl
Pasquantino and Arthur Hilts for the use of interstate wires to facilitate an alcohol smuggling scheme originating in Maryland.166 The defendants profited from the illegal transportation of alcohol into Canada and the sale of that liquor on black markets without payment of
the Canadian excise and sales tax.167 The defendants were convicted
at trial of wire fraud in a scheme not unlike those tried in the First
and Second Circuits.168
The district court denied a motion to dismiss under the reasoning
of Boots, but the appellate court reversed those convictions agreeing
with the First Circuit that, under the revenue rule, upholding the convictions “would amount functionally to penal enforcement of Canadian customs and tax laws.”169 The majority members of the panel
162. Id. at 552-53.
163. Id. at 552.
164. See id. at 552-53.
165. United States v. Pasquantino, 305 F.3d 291, 293 (4th Cir. 2002).
166. Id.
167. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 324-25.
168. Id.
169. Pasquantino, 305 F.3d at 296 (quoting Boots, 80 F.3d at 587). It is notable that Judge
Gregory wrote the decision to which E.D.Va. Judge Lee, sitting by designation joined, but Se nior Judge Hamilton, the author of the en banc opinion affirming the convictions, dissented. Id.
at 292, 299.
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based their application of the revenue rule on Hand’s rationale of
comity, which states that United States courts should not be required
to review foreign revenue statutes and, additionally, the courts should
avoid the interpretation and application of foreign laws.170 In the dissent, Judge Hamilton took the view of the Second Circuit that the
revenue rule is not implicated in the prosecution by the United States
of fraud within the United States when the purpose of the fraud is to
defraud another state of property, and it is incidental that the property is tax revenues.171
The court granted an en banc rehearing of the decision, and Senior Judge Hamilton wrote the majority decision affirming the convictions.172 The court framed the issue as whether “application of the
common law revenue rule precludes prosecution under the federal
wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, for use of interstate wires for the
purpose of executing a scheme to defraud a foreign sovereign of its
property rights in accrued tax revenue.”173 The court first relied on
section 483 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law for
a definition of the revenue rule: “Courts in the United States are not
required to recognize or to enforce judg ments for the collection of
taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of other states.”174
The court reviewed the decisions in Boots, Canada, and Gilbertson
and found common rationales for the revenue rule.175 First, comity
suggested that courts should not subject foreign public laws to judicial
scrutiny, as sovereignty protects the court of one nation from the obligation to further the national interests of another nation, and the
doctrine of separation of powers requires the judicial branch to not
interfere in matters of foreign policy.176
The reading of the revenue rule presented by the defense was
broader and based on the early English cases, Holman v. Johnson and

170. Id. at 297-98.
171. Id. at 299-300 (Hamilton, S. Cir. J., dissenting).
172. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 324.
173. Id.
174. R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) of FOREIGN R ELATIONS LAW of the UNITED STATES § 483
(1987). This definition seems rather limited as it is addressed solely at judgments and does not
contemplate matters in which the revenue laws of another country are implicated, a central part
of the courts’ historical decisions where the issue of whether the revenue laws of a foreign state
should influence the jurisdiction or decision of the court.
175. United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 327 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. granted,
124 S. Ct. 1875 (2004).
176. Id.
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Planche v. Fletcher.177 The defense reading required that no court
ever recognize a revenue law of another state.178 The court easily disposed of this characterization: the early statements were dicta—in
Holman, the statement was made in a discussion of the choice of law
issue and in Planche , the issue was fraud in England, not whether the
consideration of French import taxes was required.179 The court instead looked to the formulation of the revenue rule in 1952, when the
wire fraud statute was enacted. 180 The court characterized the rule as
permissive and not mandatory, and the force of the rule was addressed at foreign tax judgments, not to the non-recognition of foreign revenue laws.181 Under this reading, foreign revenue laws are
not subject to the Restatement, just judgments based on foreign tax
judgments.182 The court concluded that the First Circuit erred in
Boots, and wire fraud prosecutions do nothing to enforce tax judgments or revenue laws of the victim state and, as a result of this characterization of the revenue rule and the criminal charge, the revenue
rule is inapplicable in a wire fraud prosecution.183
The court next considered the rationale often offered that the
revenue rule protects the doctrine of separation of powers. The disinclination of courts to usurp the power of the executive and legislative branches by engaging in foreign policy was not implicated because Congress enacted the wire fraud statute that encompassed
fraud in foreign commerce against money or property, and the executive branch participated in the prosecution by indicting the defendants and prosecuting the suit.184 The doctrine of separation of powers was respected in the wire fraud prosecution, according to the
court, by this degree of participation by the other branches of the
government.185 The majority of the en banc court affirmed the convictions on rehearing.

177. Id. at 327-29.
178. Id. at 328.
179. Id. at 329.
180. Id.
181. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d at 329.
182. Id. at 330 n.3.
183. Id. at 331.
184. Id.
185. Id. Whether Congress contemplated use of the wire fraud statute to allow foreign governments to seek damages based on lost revenues is part of the question before the Supreme
Court.
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Judge Gregory, who wrote for the majority in the underlying
opinion, dissented in an opinion joined by Judge Michael.186 First,
Judge Gregory pointed out that the First Circuit and the Second Circuit are diametrically opposed in their application of the Restatement’s definition of the revenue rule.187 To overcome this difference
in interpretation, Judge Gregory accepted Lord Mansfield’s statements as persuasive evidence of the breadth of the revenue rule.188
The dissent concluded that, because a violation of the wire fraud statute requires proof of a scheme to deprive another of property, and
the property that satisfied the statute was the Canadian tax on the
smuggled liquor, proof relating to Canadian revenue laws was required.189 The court would then be in the position of analyzing the
revenue laws of a foreign state, exactly what the revenue rule seeks to
prevent.190
A petition for certiorari was granted, and the United States Solicitor General framed the que stion as “[w]hether the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, prohibits schemes to use the interstate wires in
the United States to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue.”191
The Supreme Court issued a decision affirming the Fourth Circuit
and upholding the convictions.192
The Petitioners argued that the only harm presented by the
smuggling scheme was the loss of Canadian tax revenues, and there
was no harm in the United States.193 In support of the claim that no
prosecution was proper in the United States, the Petitioners argued
that (1) the smuggling statute required reciprocity that is not present
in this case;194 (2) the Canada -United States Treaty provides for assistance only upon presentation of a judgment and never against United

186. Id. at 338, 343 (Gregory, Cir. J. dissenting).
187. United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 339 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. granted,
124 S. Ct. 1875 (2004). (Gregory, Cir. J. dissenting).
188. Id. at 340 (Gregory, Cir. J. dissenting).
189. Id. at 341 (Gregory, Cir. J. dissenting).
190. Id. at 341-42. The dissent also noted that the sentencing guidelines calculated sentences
for a wire fraud conviction based on the amount of loss suffered by the victims, a calculation
that requires computation of the tax due to the Canadian governmental entities. Id. at 342-43
(Gregory, J. dissenting).
191. Brief for the United States in Opposition at I, Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct.
1766 (2005) (No. 03-725).
192. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1781.
193. Brief for the Petitioners at 5, Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005) (No.
03-725).
194. Id. at 29, 45-46.
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States citizens;195 (3) extradition is a more appropriate measure to collect foreign taxes;196 and (4) the revenue rule is violated by the wire
fraud prosecution.197 In support of these arguments, Petitioners
averred the revenue rule’s concern with separation of powers is violated because the wire fraud statute as a mechanism for enforcing foreign revenue laws is a radical revision of international relations in a
way not considered by Congress.198 Additionally, Petitioners asserted
that comity is violated when the courts determine foreign tax liability,
as they must when a wire fraud case is based on the avoidance of foreign taxes.199 Finally, convictions based on common law fraud could
not be supported by failure to pay taxes to a foreign sovereign and
failure to declare goods imported into a foreign country.200 As reported in the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision, Petitioners rely on an
overbroad reading of the revenue rule to foreclose any suit in United
States courts that intersects, no matter how slightly, with a foreign
revenue law and does not adequately address the modern version of
the rule 201 as a total defense from prosecution.
The Government responded that the wire fraud statute prohibits
any scheme executed through interstate wires that has as its purpose
to defraud another, and that Congress did not provide exceptions.202
The domestic criminal prosecution, according to the Government,
does not seek to enforce foreign revenue law or a claim to foreign tax
revenue.203 The Government avers that proof of the existence of foreign revenue laws does not violate the revenue rule as it does not en-

195. Id. at 47-49.
196. Id. at 46-47 and n.52; see Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Efforts to Extradite Persons for Tax Offenses, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. R EV. 653, 682-83 (2002) (summarizing the U.S.-Canada
Extradition Treaty terms regarding tax offenses).
197. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 193, at 9-27.
198. Id. at 34.
199. Id. at 38-40.
200. Id. at 33-36.
201. See William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV . INT’L L.J. 161, 179
(Winter 2002).
The revenue rule underwent a metamorphosis in the twentieth century. It changed
from a rule for sustaining the validity of contracts that violate foreign law into a rule
that bars foreign governments from collecting their taxes. Its original rationale of
promoting trade was abandoned. Instead, we find today essentially three justifications
for the revenue rule: (1) that enforcing foreign law is burdensome; (2) that scrutiny of
foreign law might cause offense to foreign nations; and (3) that foreign law is a violation of the forum’s sovereignty.
202. Brief for the United States at 6, Pasquantino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766 (2 005)
(No. 03-725).
203. Id. at 11-17.
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tail enforcement directly or indirectly of a foreign public law.204 Separation of powers is maintained because the executive acts through the
prosecutor and sovereignty is respected as there is no assertion by
Canada of authority in the United States courts.205 The Government
asserted that the court would not have administrative problems with
determining the magnitude of the loss since courts are generally adept
at determining laws of other jurisdictions.206 As to the revenue rule’s
concern for comity, the Government pointed out that, since the
prosecutor determines which cases to bring, the courts are relieved of
determining the merits of the foreign taxing system and, if the decision to prosecute is unclear, the Department of Justice can confer
with the Department of State.207 This argument was the Government’s weakest since courts are generally reluctant to assume the
Government’s assessment of the law is accurate without an independent inspection of the underlying statutes or common law rule,
whether the implicated law is domestic or foreign.208
The Supreme Court issued a decision affirming the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision, affirming Defendant’s convictions for wire
fraud.209 Justice Thomas, who wrote the majority opinion, framed the
issue as whether “a plot to defraud a foreign government of tax revenue violates the federal wire fraud statute.”210 Justice Thomas answered that query in the affirmative stating: “the plain terms of § 1343
criminalize such a scheme, and because this construction of the wire
fraud statute does not derogate from the common-law revenue rule,
we hold that it does.”211 To determine if the wire fraud statute derogates from the revenue rule, the Court looked to the state of the
revenue rule in 1952 when the wire fraud statute was enacted to see if
the revenue rule clearly barred such a prosecution. 212 Justice Thomas
204. Id. at 16-22.
205. Id. at 22-24.
206. Id. at 25-27.
207. Id. at 23-24.
208. Petitioner’s reply brief reiterated the scope of the revenue rule as quite broad and the
wire fraud statute as narrow and then attacked the gov ernment’s expansive view of executive
branch powers as insufficient to eliminate the significant separation of powers cha llenge to the
court’s power to decide a case resting on the violation of foreign state’s revenue law without
participation from Congress. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 8, Pasquantino v. United States,
125 S. Ct. 1766 (2005) (No. 03-725).
209. Pasqunatino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1781 (2005).
210. Id. at 1770.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1774. The Court initially considered whether petitioner’s satisfied the elements
of the crime of wire fraud. The two elements challenged: (1) whether they engaged in a scheme
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described the revenue rule, saying that, “at its core, it prohibited the
collection of tax obligations of foreign nations.”213
The Court considered the rulings in Colorado v. Harbeck, Maryland v. Turner, and Moore v. Mitchell, in noting that the revenue rule
prohibited “the enforcement of tax liabilities of one sovereign in the
courts of another sovereign.” 214 Additionally, the Court considered
the decisions by other common law jurisdictions.215 The Court found
these cases different from the present prosecution because the prosecution was not a suit to recover a tax liability for a foreign government but a suit brought by the United States to punish criminal conduct in the United States.216
The Court next considered the petitioner’s argument that the
revenue rule applied to indirect actions for foreign taxes.217 After
considering the opinions issued in Peter Buchanan Ltd. v. McVey by
the Irish court and the decision issued by the House of Lords in Government of India v. Taylor, the Court found that these cases, and the
other cases cited by the petitioners, did not “involve a domestic sovereign acting pursuant to authority conferred by a criminal statute.”218
The Court concluded that, although the revenue rule was extended by
courts in the twentieth century beyond its core prohibition against enforcement of foreign tax liabilities, it could not say with “any reasonable certainty whether Congress in 1952 would have considered this
prosecution within the revenue rule.”219 The Court gave scant consideration to Petitioner’s argument that the eighteenth century Engor artifice to defraud and (2) whether the object of the fraud was property in the victim’s hands,
were found by the Court to be satisfied by the smuggling operation undertaken by the petitioners. Id. at 1771-73.
213. Id. at 1775.
214. Id. at 1775 and n.7.
215. Pasqunatino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1775 and n.8 (2005) (citing to Her Ma jesty the Queen v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 1979) and Peter Buchanan Ltd. v.
McVey, [1955] Ir. 89 (S.C. 1951)).
216. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1775.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1776.
219. Id. at 1777. The Court also considered petitioner’s argument that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2004), that required restitution to
the victim, Canada, made the collection of taxes the object of the suit. The Court quickly dismissed this argument because the suit advanced the Government’s interest in punishing internal
criminal behavior and the award of restitution was to “mete out appropriate criminal punishment for that conduct.” The Court ruled that, if awarding rest itution were found to be contrary
to the revenue rule, the appropriate course would be to construe the restitution statute to not
allow such payments rather than assuming that the enactment of the restitution law repealed the
wire fraud statute as to fraud against foreign governments. Id.
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lish cases, Boucher v. Lawson and Planche v. Fletcher, stood for the
proposition that indirect enforcement of foreign revenue laws is at the
heart of the revenue rule by recognizing that the revenue rule developed into a “very different” doctrine by the twentieth century.220
Next the Court evaluated whether the rationales advanced for
the revenue rule in the twentieth century by Hand and the House of
Lords are violated by the prosecution of the smugglers under the wire
fraud statute.221 First, the Court considered whether the prosecution
posed a risk of requiring the court to evaluate the statutes of a foreign
sovereign.222 The Court perceived little risk of international friction
since the executive branch of the government, the branch responsible
for foreign relations, brought the suit and presumably evaluated the
impact such action brought to bear on relations with Canada. The
fact that the prosecution required a court to recognize a foreign revenue law to determine if there was a violation of domestic law did not
violate the revenue rule.223 Second, the Court considered whether the
prosecution furthered the governmental interests of a foreign state
but held that prosecution under the wire fraud statute was authorized
by the Congress and the Executive “irrespective of the object of the
fraud,” and there was no risk of advancing Canada’s policies illegitimately.224 Finally, the Court found the court competent to interpret
foreign statutes under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 26.1 and
noted that a prosecution witness provided uncontroverted testimony
regarding the Canadian taxes the petitioners sought to avoid.225 The
opinion concluded by remarking that, “[i]t may seem odd use of the
Federal Government’s resources to prosecute a U.S. citizen for smuggling cheap liquor into Canada. But the broad language of the wire
fraud statute authorizes it to do so,” and the Court of Appeals’ decision was affirmed. 226
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissent in which Justice Breyer joined,
with Justice Scalia and Justice Souter joined in part.227 Justice Ginsburg and Breyer expressed concern over the broad reading given to

220. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1777.
221. Id. at 1779.
222. Id. at 1780 (citing Hand’s concurrence in Moore, describing the delicacy of the task of
reviewing a foreign state’s statute and deciding whether it should be enforced).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1781.
227. Id.
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the wire fraud statute by the majority.228 Justice Scalia and Justice
Souter joined the dissent’s assertion that the prosecution before the
court implicated the revenue rule, and that Congress’s enactment of
the wire fraud statute did not displace the rule.229 The dissent found
that the revenue rule was violated because restitution to the victim,
Canada, was required under the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act.230 Because restitution is mandatory when a defendant is convicted of wire fraud, the dissent asserted that the revenue rule would
thereby be violated when the foreign sovereign’s revenue law was enforced by the domestic court, and therefore Congress did not intend
the wire fraud statute to cover a scheme to defraud a foreign government of taxes.231 Based on its difficulty with the intersection of the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act and the wire fraud statute, coupled with concerns about whether the scope of the wire fraud statue
encompassed a scheme to defraud a foreign sovereign of taxes, the
dissent would have applied the rule of lenity and would have reversed
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.232
The Court’s opinion setting forth the scope of the revenue rule in
1952 when the wire fraud statute was enacted gives some indication of
the scope of the revenue rule presently. The eighteenth century version that refused contemplation of a foreign statute that interfered
with domestic trade was not a viable construction in the twentieth
century. A revenue rule that allows a court to decline to consider a
case brought for the direct or indirect collection of taxes seems to remain a modern version of the rule, but as the court noted there remains uncertainty regarding the “indirect” recognition of foreign
revenue laws.233 The Court’s refusal to permit criminal activity within
the United States that the executive branch chose to prosecute to escape punishment under the auspices of the revenue rule conforms to
228. Id. at 1781-86. The dissent relied in part on the reasoning advanced by the First Circuit
in United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1996).
229. Id. at 1786.
230. Id. at 1787. At sentencing, the prosecutor did not urge the trial court to require restitution because the government felt it was not appropriate when the victim was a foreign government defrauded of tax revenue. At oral arguments, the Government stated that restitution
should be ordered, and such restitution did not infringe upon the revenue rule. Id.
231. Id.
232. Pasquantino, 125 S. Ct. at 1787-88. The dissent also noted that the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines determine sentences for wire fraud based on the loss suffered by the victim. In a
footnote, the dissent suggested that the petitioner should be resentenced in light of the Court’s
decision in Booker v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), finding the guidelines unconstitutional
and advisory at best. Pasquantnio, 125 S. Ct. at 1783 n.5 .
233. Id. at 1779.
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the United States’ strong intolerance for undertakings that are illegal
under domestic law.
C. Scope of the Revenue Rule in Current Controversies
In Pasquantino, the Court found that a wire fraud prosecution
did not implicate the revenue rule’s concern that courts will become
involved in international relations best left to the other branches of
government, that courts will be placed in the position of making public policy decisions about foreign revenue laws at the risk of offending
foreign governments, or that courts will have to exhaust excessive judicial resources in comprehending foreign revenue laws.234 A criminal
fraud that occurred partially within the United States in violation of a
federal statute was not allowed to escape prosecution because the
harm intended was aimed at a foreign government and its public law
for the collection of revenue. The Court’s decision did not place new
limits on the revenue rule. Neither did the opinion expressly state the
full scope of the revenue rule.
The Court did state that it expressed no opinion on the civil
RICO suits and whether such suits will fall afoul of the revenue rule
because they are attempts by foreign governments to collect taxes
from smugglers.235 As defined in its most narrow reading, the revenue
rule does not permit a foreign sovereign to utilize the courts of the
United States to directly or indirectly collect taxes due under its revenue laws or to enforce a tax judgment.236 The RICO suits are clearly
an attempt to indirectly collect excise taxes on smuggled cigarettes.
As discussed in Part VII, the continued existence of the revenue rule
depends in part of the availability of collection methods other than
legal action in a foreign jurisdiction for collection of taxes. The use of
civil RICO suits in United States courts would appear to be only one
option open to governments who are attempting to collect taxes from
corporate smugglers, and United States courts have properly held
that the revenue rule precludes such suits.

234. Id. at 1778-80.
235. Id. at 1771 n.1.
236. Contra Brendan Delany, Note and Comment, Bucking the Trend Toward EC Competence: An American Court Responds to a Suit by the European Community, 21 J.L. & COM. 209,
213-18 (Spring 2002) (reporting that Judge Garaufis (E.D.N.Y.) in his July 2001 decision found
the revenue rule not implicated in the suit and finding no separation of powers impediment);
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
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VI. ARGUMENTS FOR ABANDONING THE REVENUE
RULE
A number of authors have opined that the revenue rule is no
longer desirable in the changed contemporary atmosphere of international relationships and the prevalence of international commerce.
These arguments are presented, and then, in Part VII, the case for the
retention of the revenue rule is made. The arguments of each author
are considered against a cha racterization of the revenue rule as a
mechanism for protecting courts from involvement in international
relations and decisions best left to the executive and le gislative
branches of government, a rule that prevents courts from rendering
decisions that offend foreign governments by discounting or negating
their public laws, and a defense against the inordinate expenditure of
judicial resources in parsing meaning from foreign revenue laws.
A. The Discussion in the United States
An early article defined three bases for the revenue rule: historical precedent; tax rulings, which are similar to penal laws that are denied enforcement in foreign jurisdictions; and judicial scrutiny of foreign revenue laws, which is injurious to foreign relations, as described
by Hand in Moore.237 The author found the historical justification
unpersuasive in part because the world’s economies interact more frequently, and are more interdependent than they were when the rule
was first enunciated. 238 Additionally, to the extent the justification of
the rule was protectionism, “the effect of the revenue rule as a whole
to encourage domestic commerce at the expense of other jurisdictions
arguably has the long term harmful effect of reducing United States
markets abroad.”239 This rationale for the rule appears, if at all, in
Lord Hardwicke’s original comment that:
If it should be laid down, that because goods are prohibited to be
exported by the laws of any foreign country from whence they are
brought, therefore the parties should have no remedy or action
here, it would cut off all benefit of such trade from this kingdom,
which would be very bad consequences to the principal and most
beneficial branches of our trade, and is not a present day rationale.240

237. Barbara A. Silver, Modernizing the Revenue Rule: The Enforcement of Foreig n Tax
Judgments, 22 GA . J. INT’L & COMP. L. 609, 612 (Fall 1992).
238. Id. at 617-18.
239. Id. at 618.
240. Boucher v. Lawson, (1734) 95 Eng. Rep. 55, 55-56 (K.B.).
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The article further notes that the expansion of the revenue rule from
a disinclination to consider foreign revenue laws in suits regarding
commercial contracts does not support prohibition of the recognition
of foreign tax judgments.241 It is noted that revenue laws are not like
penal laws and should not be denied recognition on the same basis.242
Finally, the issue of sovereignty is found not relevant because foreign
states are seeking the enforcement of a judgment, and the forum
court should enforce the judgment from the taxing jurisdiction without examination of the foreign law supporting the judgment; this acceptance of a foreign revenue judgment would avoid interference
with foreign sovereignty.243 This failure to examine the underlying
revenue statute is justified by the presumption that taxes rarely conflict with the enforcing state’s public policy since all states impose
revenue laws.244 The article concludes by advocating the enforcement
of judgments for foreign taxes but not actions for the colle ction of assessments not reduced to judgments in the taxing state’s jurisdiction. 245
This author did not have benefit of the arguments made in the
RICO and wire fraud cases and additionally does not carefully consider the international repercussions from the enforcement of a tax
judgment from a foreign country based on a revenue law that is antithetical to United States public policy. Although the Restatement
adopts acceptance of foreign tax judgments alone, and not suit for tax
liabilities, it describes the revenue rule as discretionary.246 Silver does
not offer a sound argument for not allowing courts the discretion to
decline enforcement under the revenue rule if the underlying revenue
statute is perceived to present difficult policy issues rather than risk
offending a foreign sovereign.
In a more current article by Kovatch, the revocation of the revenue rule is contemplated because the author found Judge Hand’s jus-

241. Silver, supra note 237, at 618-19.
242. Id. at 619.
243. Id. at 621-23.
244. Id. at 623-24. This view is not shared by the judges that heard the RICO and wire fraud
cases. See Pasquantino, 305 F.3d at 297 n.9 (contrasting evasion of Canada’s liquor tax with evasion of tax revenues from Iraq or Afghanistan or the evasion of a tax imposed by Canada on the
importation of Bibles); Canada, 268 F.3d at 113 (considering a tax on the sale of United States
newspapers, an exorbitant tax on machinery manufactured in the United States, a tax to deter
sales of an American product, or an immigration tax on a religious group).
245. Silver, supra note 237, at 629.
246. R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) of FOREIGN R ELATIONS LAW of the UNITED STATES § 483
(1987).
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tification resting on comity insufficient under present standards that
require a generic foreign judgment to be “repugnant to the fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought.”247 The standards imposed on the enforcement of
foreign judgments are enforced, and occasionally courts decline to enforce the judgments.248 Comity would be respected because the public
policy doctrine is widely accepted by other nations.249
Kovatch asserts that those who engage in transactions in a state
receive benefits from the state and that persons should, under the notion of reciprocity, contribute to the operation of the government of
that state, and recognition of judgments that represent this obligation
prevent the United States from becoming a tax haven.250 Finally,
Kovatch asserts the revenue rule encourages United States citizens to
renounce their citizenship and, despite the enactment of section 877
of the Internal Revenue Code, enforcement is not possible under the
revenue rule and those expatriates escape liability.251
Kovatch’s comparison of foreign judgments resting on revenue
laws with generic foreign judgments is well taken, and the Restatement allows courts to enforce foreign revenue judgments. His argument based on reciprocity is valid, but the enforcement of foreign
revenue laws is best undertaken in the country where the liability is
incurred to protect courts from incursions into foreign public laws.
Finally, Kovatch seems to advocate the repeal of the revenue rule so
that other countries will grant reciprocity to the United States in its
attempts to collect taxes from expatriated United States citizens. This
problem would appear to lend itself to treaty terms rather than the
abrogation of the revenue rule so that the United States does not find
itself enforcing revenue laws of foreign states against foreign nationals as a matter of reciprocity.
Another article attacks the revenue rule because tax claims under appropriate treaties would not be subject to attack as invalid or in
violation of the forum state’s public policy.252 Courts would be free of
247. William J. Kovatch, Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An Arg ument for the Revocation of the Revenue Rule, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 265, 277-78 (Winter 2000) (quoting Tahan v.
Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
248. Id. at 278-79.
249. Id. at 279-80.
250. Id. at 281-83.
251. Id. at 283-84; I.R.C. § 877 (2000).
252. Vitaly S. Timokhov, Enforcing Tax Judgments Across Borders: How Collection Assistance Can Overcome Limitations of the Revenue Rule (Part 2), 14 J. INT’L TAX’N 20, 22-23 (Sept.
2003).
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making such evaluations because any challenge would be an encroachment by the judicial system on the prerogative of the executive
branch, and the revenue rule could, in the face of such treaties, be
abolished.253 The use of treaties to shape the extent one government
is willing to permit its courts to enforce judgments imposed under another government’s revenue laws has been undertaken by the United
States to the extent the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is comfortable with the arrangement. But treaties do not negate the usefulness of a rule that protects courts from involving themselves in matters they discern best left outside the judicial process.
B. The Revenue Rule as Perceived by Foreign Writers
The revenue rule is also attacked in international journals. A
British legal scholar advocates abandonment of the revenue rule and
application of choice of law rules to revenue claims as they are to
other claims and that indirect suits for taxes should be decided on the
basis of private law rights that are not impacted by the fact that enforcement of the rights may result in the collection of taxes by a foreign state.254 Briggs asserts that the revenue rule appears to sanction
the evasion of taxes, and a contractual claim for taxes should be considered under the choice of law regime where “claims will be characterized; and choice of law will follow. No separate exclusionary rule
will be needed.”255 In private suits, if equity exists between the parties
the court would not lack jurisdiction and could enforce duties even if,
as a result of the enforcement, a foreign state would consequently collect tax revenue and “[p]rivate law rights should not be poisoned by
the existence of a public law interest.”256 Briggs’ makeover would
permit the choice of law mechanism to prevent a foreign state from
coming to a domestic court and enforcing a revenue law but would allow a broad range of private suits. Suits seeking payments of debts
that would, in whole or part, pay taxes owed to a foreign government
would no longer be subject to the revenue rule, and the unsatisfactory
result of some earlier British cases where courts refused to hear cases
because a foreign government stood to benefit from tax collection if
the plaintiff won, would be avoided. There is strong appeal to the
idea of narrowing the revenue rule so that private parties could ad253. Id. at 23.
254. Adrian Briggs, The Revenue Rule in the Conflict of Laws: Time for a Makeover, 2001
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 280, 295-96 (Dec. 2001).
255. Id. at 296.
256. Id. at 297.
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vance cases that have only a tangential tax element, and such cases
should not be precluded by concern for relationships between sovereigns.257 Briggs fails to address the concern United States courts express regarding the RICO cases and the fact that the cases require the
courts to compute the lost tax revenues to calculate the proper scope
of damages, and the implicit recognition such computation would offer to the revenue laws of a foreign state outside the terms agreed to
in treaties.
An Australian scholar reviewed the history of the revenue rule,
noting that it was adopted by Australia as part of English common
law.258 Burgess suggests that allowing reciprocal enforcement of
revenue debts would benefit both countries involved in an international collection effort because it would allow reciprocal revenue debt
collection.259 Burgess suggests that of the enforcement mechanisms
available, revenue judgments should be enforced under the statutes
permitting recognition of civil judgments, or alternatively the OECD
treaty creates a framework in the Convention of Mutual Assistance in
Tax Matters to require assistance in the collection of member nation’s
foreign tax debts.260 Burgess generally assumes that collection of foreign tax debts in domestic courts is based on comity and, as long as
the revenue law is not repugnant to the public policy of the country
where enforcement is sought, courts should recognize revenue judgments of foreign courts.261 It is this caveat, that the law is not repugnant to the public policy of the country in which the court sits, that is
the foundation of the idea that courts should not be making that determination in an action in law.
Two Spanish scholars advocate adopting international bilateral
agreements to assist in the collection of tax liabilities.262 One author
dismissed the present reluctance to enforce tax judgments because of
the “need to prosecute fiscal fraud and control [tax] evasion.”263 The
other author stated the revenue rule is “anachronistic and leads to jurisdiction-hopping, displacing the tax burde n of citizens who avoid

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 298.
Burgess, supra note 110, at 645.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 649-52.
Id. at 645-46.
Franciso Alfredo Garcia Prats, Mutual Assistance in Collection of Tax Debts, 30
INTERTAX 56, 58-59 (2002); Amparo Grau, Mutual Assistance for the Collection of Tax Claims,
28 INTERTAX 241, 245-46 (2000).
263. Prats, supra note 262, at 59.
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paying their taxes.”264 This author suggests extending the United
States constitutional doctrine of full faith and credit internationally,
as the United States Supreme Court did with tax judgments between
domestic states.265 These discussions did not evaluate the rationale
underlying the revenue rule including the reluctance of courts to undertake roles reserved for the legislative and executive branches of
government but rather address a method for arriving at agreements
that can increase the efficiency of tax debt collection.266
Finally, an English practitioner, in reaction to the United States
RICO cases, evaluates the foundations of the revenue rule.267 Baker
asserts sovereignty is more a description of the rule than an explanation, and comity is not a concern in a world where courts routinely review laws of foreign jurisdictions in private law suits.268 He notes that
the RICO case decisions rested on the idea of separation of powers.269
Baker asserts that to abrogate the revenue rule “risks undermining
our existing framework for international taxation” but observes that
this is currently under consideration in the European Union. 270 The
Amendment to the European Mutual Assistance Directive, which required compliance by June 30, 2002, abrogated the revenue rule
among the European Union member states, and Article 27 of the
EOCD Model Treaty provides for assistance in the collection of tax
debts and allowed adoption of tax collection assistance terms in treaties.271 Baker asserts that abrogation of the revenue rule facilitates
taxation of non-resident citizens.272 Although Baker dismisses the
revenue rule as lacking in sound basis, he fails to solve the problem of
courts addressing foreign tax laws on a policy level.
Although these arguments for the abandonment of the revenue
rule offer alternative existing structures to permit courts to enforce

264. Grau, supra note 262, at 243.
265. Id. at 243.
266. See, e.g., Grau, supra note 262, at 245-46.
267. Philip Baker, Changing the Norm on Cross-border Enforcement of Debts, 30 INTERTAX
216, 216 (2002).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 216-17.
271. Id. at 217; see European Council Directive 2001/44, 2001 O.J. (L 175/117).
272. Baker, supra note 267, at 217; Baker posits two examples where abrogation of the
revenue rule would result in fairer results and better administration of the tax system: (1) abrogation eliminates the need for departure taxes on appreciated assets removing from taxing jurisdictions prior to a recognition event; and, (2) a method for taxation of exercised stock options
that were received in another country and exercised in a second would result. Id. at 217-18.
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revenue judgments and claims, the analysis by the authors does not
address the public policy issues that concern United States courts.
Courts are concerned with the interpretation of foreign revenue law
and, more importantly, with the problem of enforcing a tax that offends United States public policy through an unreasonable tax on
United States products, a tax on activities encouraged or permitted in
the United States, or a discriminatory tax under United States sensibilities. This concern is expressed as a matter of comity, a desire not
to embarrass a foreign state by impugning its statutes.273
Nor do the authors define the rationale that supports courts entering into the realm of international relations regarding recognition
of revenue laws in other states. Courts are reluctant to decide that a
specific foreign revenue law is not subject to enforcement when the
executive and legislative branches have not had the opportunity to
consider the impact of such a decision in conversations with foreign
governments. Part VII advocates the retention of the revenue rule as
sound judicial policy that alleviates the need for judges to make foreign policy decisions.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE REVENUE RULE STILL HAS A
ROLE TO PLAY
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law offers a narrow definition of the revenue rule: “Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of
taxes, fines or penalties rendered by the courts of other states.”274
This is the rule that led to the decisions by the Canadian Supreme
Court in Harden and the Ninth Circuit in Gilbertson. This rule is subject to abrogation by treaty, but the United States has declined to
open its judicial system to the enforcement of foreign tax judgments
in this manner.275 This version of the rule rests squarely on the rationales offered by Judge Hand and by the House of Lords in Taylor.
It restrains the judicial system from examining and passing judgments
on the revenue laws of another state, it prohibits foreign states from
extending their sovereign will into the courts of another state, and it

273. See Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1929); Attorney Gen. of Can. v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Pasquantino, 305 F.3d 291, 297 n.9 (4th Cir. 2002).
274. See supra note 174.
275. See discussion supra , Part V.
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eliminates the need for courts to master the intricacies of a foreign
revenue system.276
But the argument against the revenue rule is in part based on the
idea that it is unfair to allow those who have avoided a tax obligation
in a foreign state to escape enforcement in the state where they are
located. This may be a valid argument in a few estate tax cases where
the estate consists of fungible assets that are easily transported. It is
less applicable under current taxing regimes for excise and income
taxes for several reasons. First, a taxpayer will generally have sufficient property in the taxing state that gave rise to the revenue that
those assets can be attached by the taxing authority. This perception
is based on the fact that the only case seeking tax from United States
citizens for unpaid taxes resulted from a logging operation where the
product was removed from Canada, and one can assume no facility or
assets remained in Canada after the timber was removed. But this is
not the normal characterization of a business subject to tax in a foreign jurisdiction, and assets of some description would presumably be
available for attachment. Additionally, the majority of businesses
maintain ongoing relationships within the country to which they owe
taxes.
Second, when the income is passive and no assets other than an
investment in intangibles, stocks, bonds, bank accounts or other instruments exist, nations use withholding tax to collect the tax due
from the investor.277 Enforcement in the United States is aided by a
code provision making withholding agents personally liable for the
amount required to be withheld.278 The ability of the state where
revenue is created to collect taxes owed to it seems sufficient to permit the sovereign state to administer its tax collection system within
its own borders, without any ongoing need to revert to a foreign judicial system to enforce judgments.

276. James Eustice attributes to Learned Hand the observation:
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example, merely dance
before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception—couched in abstract terms that offer no ha ndle to seize hold of—
leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time.
James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner, 45 TAX L. R EV. 7, 7 (Fall 1989). The
effort required to parse the meaning from foreign statutes would, one assumes, be every bit as
daunting a task.
277. In the United States the withholding tax is provided for under I.R.C. §§ 871, 881 (2000).
278. I.R.C. § 1461 (2000).
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Enforcement of revenue judgments under the rules regulating
the enforcement of other judgments requires that due process concerns be satisfied, including that the party against whom the judgment
has been entered was served with notice of the debt and subjected
himself to personal jurisdiction of the foreign court.279 The concern
that persons would flee the jurisdiction and seek safe harbor in the
United States as a tax evader would not be solved by a scheme that
required the tax evader to appear in the foreign jurisdiction to have a
judgment for taxes entered against him. If the tax evader violated the
revenue laws of a state, that state’s course of action would lie in an
extradition proceeding if the offense was a serious criminal offense.280
Under the broader definition of the revenue rule, cases brought
to enforce tax liabilities that have not been reduced to a judgment or
cases alleging liability in a civil suit for damages based on the amount
of tax avoided are dismissed in United States courts. These decisions
narrow Lord Mansfield’s absolute standard of total non-recognition
that allowed enforcement of contracts based on undertakings that
violated revenue laws. The standard has eroded, but it exists in a less
virulent form in United States and British courts. Foreign states are
precluded from indirect enforcement of revenue laws as seen in
Drukker, King of Hellenes, Taylor, and Municipal Council of Sydney.281 This modern construction of the rule properly excludes suits
by foreign governments under the RICO statutes for unpaid taxes.
Governments can seek prosecution within their own borders and rely
on domestic civil enforcement of tax liabilities to collect tax from
evaders. A sophisticated smuggling scheme such as that alleged in the
cigarette company cases involves actors with businesses in the victim
countries. Lost revenues can be recovered from the domestic actors.
Non-corporate smugglers can be reached through domestic criminal
indictments and, if necessary, extradition suits.
The concern that underlies, at least in part, the revenue rule is
that courts are reluctant to engage in evaluation of another state’s decision to raise revenue in any particular way or to discourage or en-

279. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, § 4(b) (1963). Section 4(b) provides that a foreign judgment need not be recognized if (1) there was lack of sufficient notice;
(2) there was fraud in obtaining the judgment; (3) the foreign judgment is repugnant to public
policy; (4) the judgment sought to be enforced conflicts with other judgments; (5) the parties
agreed to a different proceeding that the one before the foreign court; or (6) the forum court
was “seriously inconvenient.” Id.
280. See Zagaris, supra note 196, at 682-83.
281. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
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courage behavior through social eng ineering in the tax system. States
have sufficient “hooks” to catch tax evaders within their own borders
or to capture tax on income before it leaves the country, and these
mechanisms weigh against interference by the judiciary of another
country. The revenue rule, as described by the Second and Fourth
Circuit, fulfills its function as a means of protecting courts from (1)
interfering with the foreign relations function of the executive and
legislative branches of government, (2) allowing United States courts
to become enforcement arms of foreign governments in revenue matters, and (3) rescuing courts from the necessity of considering the validity and the intricacies of foreign revenue laws.282 The Supreme
Court described the purposes of the revenue rule: (1) “judicial
evaluation of the policy laden enactments of other sovereigns,” (2)
separation of powers when the executive is “the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations,” and (3) the
competency of the courts to “examine the validity of unfamiliar tax
law schemes.”283 Although the Court’s decision was narrowly focused
on the revenue rule as a defense in a wire fraud prosecution, the
Court accepts the broad rationales that underlay the common law
rule.
The revenue rule fills, in the twenty-first century, a role necessary to protect the judiciary from making decisions better left to the
other branches of government and immersing itself in the intricate
and sensitive area of tax enforcement for other nations. In a world
with far more international contact and far greater reliance on international trade than Lord Mansfield could imagine when he first attempted to protect British trade and British courts from the vagaries
of foreign revenue laws, the revenue rule stands on firm ground and
should not be abandoned or modified so that courts must deal with
matters best left to others. Whether the courts ultimately adopt this
stance will be seen as the Second Circuit re-evaluates its decision in
the European Community decision.284

282. As discussed in Part V C, violations of United States laws should not be subject to the
revenue rule because the criminal behavior occurred in the United States and the defense that
an act to defraud a foreign government of revenue cannot const itute a crime in the United
States offends a sense of justice that is an older common law concept than the revenue rule. As
noted, the Supreme Court affirmed convictions for wire fraud when the object of the fraud was
avoidance of Canadian excise taxes on alcohol at least in part under this reasoning.
283. Pasqunatino v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 1779-80 (2005).
284. European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, 125 S. Ct. 1968, 1968 (2005).

